With movements such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, there were fears that protectionism would reign supreme and globalization would enter a retreat. These concerns have been overblown, at least says recent research from the University of Waterloo.

Concerns about the health of globalization reared up again earlier this year after the Chinese spy balloon crisis highlighted tensions between the two countries. It prompted fears that the world might split into two opposing camps. It’s a fear that the researchers don’t believe is warranted.

“First, the potential economic cost of doing this is too high for the U.S., China, their allies, and the entire world,” they say. “The breakdown of globalization ultimately hurts consumers, which we are all experiencing too well. Globalization is not over.”

According to the researchers, the U.S.-China rivalry is not only driven by economic factors, but also by misunderstandings. One example is that China’s efforts towards “self-reliance” were seen as aggressive in Washington, while they were actually defensive in nature. On the other hand, China’s communist leaders were dissatisfied with what they perceived as American attempts to curb China’s growing influence.

Limited risk

The authors believe that Washington may have overestimated China’s threat to the liberal world order, due to technological nationalism. The first reason is that China’s top-down approach to innovation may not be enough to sustain its technological advancement. Second, the continued decline in economic growth could limit China’s ability to fund its technological innovations. Lastly, the former one-child policy is leading to a shortage of young workers in the next decade, which may further affect China’s progress.

In conclusion, the key assumptions that China’s rapid pace of technology innovation will continue and that it will surpass the U.S. in strategic fields are likely overstated, according to the researchers.

“We expect China’s threat will slowly disappear—it is not sustainable,” the researchers conclude. “Once the fear of China’s rise declines in the U.S., we expect the disengagement to slow down and even dissipate. We can be conservatively optimistic there will be changes.”